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SURVEY

2013 ANNUAL SURVEY: RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN SPORTS LAW
INTRODUCTION
This survey provides a snapshot of important sports industry cases decided
between January 1, 2013 and December 31, 2013. Not every sports-related case
decided in 2013 is included in this survey. Instead, this survey briefly
summaries a wide range of cases that impacted the sports industry in 2013. The
survey intends to provide the reader with greater insight into the many current
sports-related legal issues and to highlight the most recent developments in
sports law. To better assist the reader, this survey is arranged alphabetically by
the specific substantive area of law associated with each sports law case.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Administrative law covers the actions of the federal, state, and local
governments, such as adjudicating, rulemaking, and regulatory enforcement.
One interesting case involving the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
is included below.
Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC v. FCC1
Comcast Cable offers cable television to subscribers in several different
packages known as tiers. Comcast carries two of its own sports networks,
Versus and the Golf Channel, on its most broadly distributed tiers, and carries
another sports network, the Tennis Channel, on a less broadly distributed tier.
In 2009, the TennisChannel successfully filed a complaint with the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) alleging that Comcast violated the
Communications Act of 1964 by refusing to broadcastthe Tennis Channel as
widely as its own sports networks. Comcast filed a petition with the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia seeking to review the
FCC’s order providing the Tennis Channel with the same coverage as Versus
and the Golf Channel. The court granted Comcast’s petition because the FCC
did not provide evidence that Comcast would receive any benefit from placing

1. 717 F.3d 982 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
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the Tennis Channel on a more broadly distributed tier, and thus the FCC did not
prove that Comcast discriminated against the Tennis Channel based on its
affiliation with Versus and the Golf Channel.
ANTITRUST LAW
Antitrust law exists to protect consumers from unfair business practices and
anticompetitive behavior. The federal Sherman Antitrust Act prohibits
monopolistic behavior and conspiracies to restrain trade. Many courts find
unique applications of the Sherman Act within the sports industry, particularly
within collegiate athletics. Each year many cases focus on antitrust claims, and
2013 was no exception, as several cases brought antitrust claims, particularly
against the NCAA.
Bleid Sports, LLC v. NCAA2
Bleid Sports, a basketball tournament promotion company, sued the NCAA
claiming antitrust violations due to the NCAA’s denial of a waiver to host a
basketball tournament at Kentucky’s Rupp Arena, a NCAA member institution
facility. Bleid Sports claimed that the University of Kentucky’s legislative
relief waiver was denied after several confirmations by the NCAA that the
tournament would be compliant with the association’s bylaws. Once the waiver
was denied, the university refused to host the tournament in order to steer clear
of an NCAA infraction. As a result, Bleid Sports moved its tournament to a local
high school. Bleid Sports claimed that it suffered damages in the amount of the
loss of sales and registration fees resulting from the change in location. The
Court found that the NCAA lacked the capacity to be sued in its own name
under Kentucky state law. Furthermore, the Court determined that the bylaw in
question was “clearly” a recruiting rule and not commercial, and consequently
not within the reach of federal antitrust law. Therefore, the NCAA’s motion to
dismiss the suit was granted.
City of San Jose v. Officer of the Comm’r of Baseball3
The City of San Jose sued the Commissioner of Baseball alleging claims for
violations of the Sherman Act, California’s Cartwright Act, and state tort and
unfair competition laws based on Major League Baseball’s (MLB) failure to
approve the Oakland Athletics Baseball Club’s proposed relocation from
Oakland to San Jose. The defendant’s argued that the decision to deny the

2. No. 5:12–347–kkc, 2013 WL 5410988 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 26, 2013).
3. No. C–13–02787 RMW, 2013 WL 5609346 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2013).
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relocation was exempt from antitrust per the baseball antitrust exemption. Even
though this court recognized that the antitrust exemption is “unrealistic,
inconsistent, and illogical,” it still adhered to Supreme Court and found that
federal antitrust exemption for the “business of baseball” remains unchanged,
and is not limited to the reserve system.
Dang v. S.F. Forty Niners4
Plaintiff Patrick Dang alleged that he purchased NFL apparel from a retailer
for an anticompetitive overcharged price. Dang claimed that an agreement
between the NFL, its individual teams, and National Football League Properties,
Inc. (NFLP), granting Reebook exclusive licensing rights to produce NFL
apparel caused Dang to pay the anticompetitive overcharged price. Dang argued
that the defendant’s behavior harmed two possible markets: (1) “the United
States market for the licensing of the trademarks, logos, and other emblems
(collectively ‘the Intellectual Property’) of individual NFL teams for use in
apparel”; and (2) “the United States retail market for apparel bearing the
intellectual Property of any NFL team.”5 The United States District Court for
the Northern District of California found that Dang had standing to bring an
antitrust claim under his alleged second relevant market because Dang
participated in the retail market as a consumer and suffered an injury through
the overcharge of prices. The court also found that Dang had standing to bring
an antitrust claim under his first alleged relevant market, even though he did not
directly purchase NFL licenses, because Dang’s situation fell within an
exception “for indirect purchasers who suffer injuries in a market that is
‘inextricably intertwined’ with the alleged relevant market.”6 Therefore, the
court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss.
In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig.7
Twenty-one current and former NCAA Division I men’s basketball and
football student-athletes (plaintiffs) moved for class certification to pursue their
claim that the NCAA violated the Sherman Antitrust Act by conspiring with
video game developers and broadcasters “to restrain competition in the market
for the commercial use of their names, images, and likeness.”8
The United States District Court for the Northern District of California
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

964 F. Supp. 2d 1097 (N.D. Cal. 2013).
Id. at 1104.
Id. at 1112.
No. C09–1967, 2013 WL 5979327 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2013).
Id. at *1.
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certified the injunctive relief class but did not certify the monetary damages
subclass. The court found that there are questions of fact and law common to
the classes of student-athletes, the claims and interest of the plaintiffs are
common to the claims and interests of the entire class, and given that the
plaintiffs do not have any conflicts of interest with the class and have brought
the claim vigorously on behalf of the class, the plaintiffs will adequately protect
the class’ interests. However, the monetary damages subclass failed because of
the difficulties that plaintiffs would have managing a class action.
Rock v. NCAA9
Prior to John Rock’s senior season at Gardner-Webb, the school a new head
football coach who decided not to renew Rock’s athletic scholarship. As a
result, Rock had to pay for his own tuition and room and board. Rock
challenged two NCAA bylaws on antitrust grounds and claimed that without
these bylaws he would have earned more multi-year scholarship offers. Moving
to dismiss Rock’s claims the NCAA argued that he lacked antitrust standing,
failed to alleged “commercial activity” under the Sherman Act, proposed an
incorrect relevant market, and did not allege an anticompetitive effect in the
relevant market. Finding that Rock had standing to bring his claims, that he had
alleged a relevant market, and that he had alleged commercial activity in his
receipt of an athletic scholarship in exchange for an opportunity to earn
additional scholarships and play football, the district court denied the NCAA’
motion to dismiss.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Both the U.S. Constitution and state constitutions serve to protect
individuals from certain government acts. Constitutional claims are common in
the sports context, because most state athletic associations are considered state
actors and must abide by the Constitution. Although there is overwhelming
precedent that the right to participate in sports is not a constitutional right,
athletes continue to bring claims. The following cases highlight individuals
who brought claims under the Commerce Clause, First Amendment, Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and the Equal Protection Clause and Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

9. 928 F. Supp. 2d 1010 (S.D. Ind. 2013).
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Corman v. NCAA10
Pennsylvania Senator Jake Corman, joined by Treasurer Robert McCord,
filed a lawsuit against the NCAA in order to have the $12 million initial
PSU/NCAA consent decree installment put into an endowment trust operated
by the State of Pennsylvania, in accordance with Pennsylvania’s Endowment
Act. The NCAA subsequently filed preliminary objections to the State’s lawsuit
questioning the State’s standing and the constitutionality of the Endowment Act.
The Court determined that the Endowment Act was constitutional and so
overruled the NCAA’s preliminary objections in their entirety.
Doe v. Banos11
From November 2006–2009, the Haddonfield Board of Education (HBOE)
required its high school student athletes’ parents to consent to a school policy
that prohibited their child from any involvement with alcohol and drugs, on or
off school grounds (the 24/7 policy), in order to participate in school-sponsored
sports. Jane Doe’s father, Plaintiff John Doe, submitted a 24/7 policy for Jane
to play lacrosse. With the policy Doe included a letter that said “I believe the
24/7 Policy is illegal and unenforceable but have filled out the form under
duress.”12 HBOE informed Doe that the 24/7 policy he submitted was invalid
and Jane could not play lacrosse unless he signed a new form.
Doe claimed HBOE violated his First Amendment free speech right to
protest a governmental policy and express his opinion by refusing to accept his
24/7 policy form and letter. The United States District Court for the District of
New Jersey rejected Doe’s argument because he did not provide any evidence,
outside of his own beliefs, to support his claim.
J.D. v. Picayune Sch. Dist.13
On April 19, 2011, J.D. was preparing to play a baseball game for Picayune
Memorial High School baseball team. Prior to the game, the Picayune team met
on the field and chose J.D. for a pregame hazing ritual. J.D.’s teammates held
his arms behind his back and struck J.D. in the chest. J.D. fell to the ground and
suffered a seizure and facial lacerations.
J.D. and his family (the Dixons) claimed that the Picayune School District
violated J.D.’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 rights because they did not stop the hazing.

10.
11.
12.
13.

74 A.3d 1149 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2013).
966 F. Supp.2d 477 (D. N.J. 2013).
Id. at 481.
No. 1:11CV514-LG-JMR, 2013 WL 2145734 (S.D. Miss. May 15, 2013).
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The Dixon’s § 1983 claim failed because public schools “do not have a
constitutional duty to ensure that students are safe from private violence”14
unless the school creates a special relationship. The Dixons argued that
Picayune coaches created a special relationship with their students, but the
district court disagreed because Picayune did not deprive J.D. of his basic needs;
J.D. returned home each day after school; J.D. was not required to join the
baseball team or attend Picayune schools; and J.D.’s parents were at the baseball
game in which he was hazed.
Jones v. Schneiderman15
Plaintiffs, mixed martial arts (MMA) promoters, athletes, trainers, and fans,
brought an action challenging the constitutionality of a New York’ Combative
Sports Ban, which banned the live performance of professional MMA in New
York. The Court concluded that MMA is not protected under the First
Amendment because it is not a form of expressive conduct and the Combative
Sports Ban is not unconstitutionally overbroad. Therefore, the defendant’s
motion to dismiss was granted in part and denied in part, with the vagueness
challenge surviving dismissal.
NCAA v. Corbett16
This case arises from the acts of former Penn State assistant football coach
Gerald Sandusky sexually abusing children for over a decade. The NCAA
imposed a $60 million fine upon Penn State, which is to be paid over five years
into an endowment for programs devoted to preventing child sex abuse and
assisting the victims of such abuse. Shortly after, the Pennsylvania Governor
Thomas W. Corbett, Jr. signed the Pennsylvania Institution of Higher Education
Monetary Penalty Endowment Act, which required the $60 million fine be
deposited into the Commonwealth Treasury and that the funds may only be used
within the Commonwealth for the benefit of Commonwealth residents. The
NCAA responded by filing a complaint against Governor Corbett seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief because the NCAA alleged that the Endowment
Act violated the Commerce Clause, the Contract Clause, and the Takings Clause
of the U.S. Constitution.
Senator Corman motioned to intervene on behalf of the Commonwealth.
The court held that he does not have a right to intervene because he lacked a
significantly protectable interest in the action and the Commonwealth was
14. Id. at *5.
15. No. 11 Civ. 8215 (KMW)(GMG), 2013 WL 5452758 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2013).
16. 296 F.R.D. 342 (M.D. Penn. 2013).

SURVEY FORMATTED FINAL

6/4/2014 4:21 PM

2014]

2013 SURVEY

491

already adequately represented.
NCAA v. Governor of N.J.17
Professional and collegiate sports associations, including the National
Football League (NFL), National Basketball Association (NBA), MLB, and
NCAA sued the State of New Jersey concerning the passage of the state’s Sports
Wagering Law alleging that the Sports Wagering Law conflicts with the
Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992 (PASPA). The State
of New Jersey responded arguing that PASPA on constitutionality grounds
claiming that the federal law violated the Constitution’s anti-commandeering
principle. Affirming the district court, the Third Circuit determined that the
Sorts Wagering Act was preempted by PASPA.
Wyatt v. Fletcher18
During a 2009 Kilgore High School softball meeting, Kilgore softball
coaches locked student S.W. in a room and questioned her about an alleged
relationship she had with another woman. In the room, the coaches yelled and
threatened S.W., and later revealed her sexual orientation to S.W.’s mother,
Barbra Wyatt. Wyatt alleged that the softball coaches violated S.W.’s right to
privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment and claimed that S.W. has a
constitutional right to keep her sexual orientation confidential.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit determined that a
high school student does not have “a Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy
that bars a teacher or coach from discussing the student’s private matters with
the student’s parents.”19 Accordingly, the softball coaches were entitled to
qualified immunity because they did not violate any established federal right.
CONTRACT LAW
Contract law is involved in numerous facets of the sports industry. The
following cases discuss contract issues with sponsorship agreements, licensing
agreements, NCAA Conference Constitutions as contracts, and Collective
Bargaining Agreements.

17. 730 F.3d 208 (3d. Cir. 2013).
18. 718 F.3d 496 (5th Cir. 2013).
19. Id. at 510.
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ACC v. Univ. of Md.20
In response to the financial ramifications caused from member institutions
potentially withdrawing from the Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC), the ACC
adopted a mandatory withdrawal payment in its conference constitution. Soon
after the ACC adopted this rule, the University of Maryland, one of the ACC’s
member institutions, informed the ACC that they decided to withdraw from the
conference. The ACC alleged that Maryland was obligated to pay a $52,266,342
withdrawal payment.
The Court of Appeals of North Carolina affirmed the trial court denyial of
Maryland’s motion to dismiss the ACC’s claim based on sovereign immunity
because an extension of comity to Maryland would violate public policy.
Accordingly, the court did not consider whether Maryland would be entitled to
sovereign immunity under Maryland law.
Bd. of Regents v. ACC21
The University of Maryland sued the Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC),
alleging that the withdrawal payment set forth in the ACC Constitution was
invalid and unenforceable, a breach of contract and tortious interference with a
prospective advantage, and state antitrust violations. This suit came to the
Maryland Circuit Court after the University of Maryland President publicly
announced its withdrawal from the ACC. Subsequently, the ACC filed a lawsuit
against the University of Maryland, the Board of Regents, and the University
System of Maryland in order to clarify the validity and enforceability of the
conference’s withdrawal payment, after the University claimed the payment
was invalid and unenforceable.
The ACC filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, asked the court to
grant a stay of the proceedings until the initial case, filed by the ACC in North
Carolina, concluded. While the court determined that the Withdrawal Penalty
was subject to Maryland state antitrust law, it found that the University of
Maryland did not adequately state a relevant geographic or product market, in
addition to failing to allege market harm. As a result, the court dismissed the
state antitrust claims against the ACC. The court also found that Maryland
properly pleaded claims for invalidity and unenforceability of the ACC
Constitution clause, tortious interference with a prospective advantage, and
breach of contract, but issued a stay in the case pending the conclusion of the
North Carolina proceedings, stating “‘[a]n action may be stayed until a prior

20. 751 S.E. 2d 612 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013).
21. No. CAL13-02189, 2013 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 4 (Md. Cir. Ct. June 27, 2013).
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parallel action in the courts of a different sovereignty is determined.’” 22
Ultimately, the court stayed the three actions and dismissed the antitrust claims.
Milo v. Univ. of Vt.23
Plaintiff Justin Milo played varsity hockey for the University of Vermont.
In a letter, Vermont’s head hockey coach, Kevin Sneddon, offered Milo a partial
scholarship for the 2009–10 academic year and a full scholarship for 2010–11.
At the beginning of the 2009–10 academic year, Milo signed Vermont’s
Student–Athlete Code of Conduct. Later that academic year, Sneddon dismissed
Milo from the team. In an August 4, 2010 letter, SFS notified Milo that his
scholarship would not be renewed for 2010–11 and informed him of its
scholarship nonrenewal appeals process.
Milo argued that Sneddon’s letter to Milo created a contract with Vermont,
and Sneddon breached the contract by failing to provide Milo a full scholarship
for 2010–11 . The United States District court for the District of Vermont
concluded Sneddon’s letter did not create a contract with Milo because
Sneddon’s letter did not constitute an offer given that it informed Milo that his
scholarship would not renew automatically. Additionally, Milo argued that the
Code created a contract between himself and Vermont, and Vermont breached
when Sneddon dismissed him from the team. Although Vermont agreed that
the Code created a contract, the court dismissed Milo’s breach of contract claim
because Milo did not utilize the Code’s appeals process.
Mount Snow Ltd. v. ALLI, the Alliance of Action Sports24
Plaintiff Mount Snow Ltd., a Vermont ski and snowboard resort, had a
tentative agreement with the Alliance of Action Sports (AAS) to host the east
coast Winter Dew Tour in 2010 and 2011. Mount Snow signed the agreement
but AAS did not. Mount Snow hosted the 2009 and 2010 Winter Dew Tour,
but AAS relocated the 2011 Dew Tour to a different Vermont resort. Mount
Snow alleged that the parties entered in a contract and AAS breached that
contract. Additionally, Mount Snow alleged breach of contract implied-in-fact.
The United States District Court of Vermont denied Mount Snow’s motion
for summary judgment on its claim for breach of contract because: (1) neither
party expressly reserved the right to not be bound until the contract was fully
executed; (2) hosting the 2010 Dew Tour did not constitute partial performance;
and (3) the parties did not unequivocally agree upon all the substantive terms.
22. Id. at *58 (quoting Apenyo v. Apenyo, 32 A.3d 511, 516 (Md. App. Ct. 2011)).
23. No. 2:12–cv–124, 2013 WL 4647782 (D. Vt. Aug. 29, 2013).
24. No. 1:12–cv–22–jgm, 2013 WL 4498816 (D. Vt. Aug. 21, 2013).
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Additionally, the court found that a 2010–11 Dew Tour implied-in-fact contract
could have existed because Mount Snow signed the agreement, hosted the 2010
event, and an AAS representative referenced the agreement in later discussions
about the 2011 event. Accordingly, the court found that summary judgment was
also improper on the breach of an implied-in-fact contract. The trial is set to
process in 2014, unless a settlement can be reached.
Simms v. Jones25
The plaintiffs in this case were ticketholders for Super Bowl XLV held at
Cowboy Stadium on February 6, 2011, bringing claims for breach of contract,
based on certain seats being unavailable and being forced to relocate, seats
having an obstructed view of play, and being delayed in accessing their seats.
The plaintiffs are attempting to certify four classes to prosecute the claims in
this case. In order to certify a class action suit, the proposed class must meet the
four prerequisites of a class action laid out in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
26(a) and the action must be maintainable under one of the three categories set
forth in FRCP 23(b). The court concluded that the displaced class could not be
certified because it did not provide evidence that geographic diversity would
prevent joinder. The court concluded that the delayed class, persons who were
delaying in gaining access to their seats, could be certified but that
individualized questions were predominant and decided not to certify the class.
The court concluded that the relocated class, persons who were relocated from
their assigned seats, could not be certified because each seat is unique. Finally,
the court concluded that the obstructed view class, persons who bought tickets
and their view was obstructed, could not be certified because the predominance
of the individual damages issue.
COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT
The Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) is an international arbitration body
headquartered in Lausanne, Switzerland. Rule 61 of the Olympic Charter
requires that all disputes in connection with the Olympic Games must be
submitted to CAS. Decisions made by CAS are appealed to the Swiss Federal
Tribunal. The following CAS decisions focus on anti-doping violations and
eligibility.

25. Nos. 3:11–cv–0248–M, 3:11–cv–345–M, 2013 WL 3449538 (N.D. Tex. July 9, 2013).
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Andrus Veerpalu v. Int’l Ski Fed’n26
In March of 2013, CAS set aside a three-year sanction imposed on Andrus
Veerpalu by the International Ski Federation. Veerpalu, an accomplished
Estonian Downhill Skier, was accused of having exogenous human growth
hormone (HGH) in his system as evidenced by multiple positive laboratory test
conducted by the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA). On appeal to the
International Ski Federation (FIS), Veerpalu argued that the delay between the
analyses of the two samples taken affected the accuracy of the test and rendered
the results unreliable. After the hearing, FIS determined that any defects in the
process would have resulted in a false negative rather than a false positive.
Ultimately, CAS determined that FIS did not meet its burden of proof in
showing that the delay would have resulted in a false negative. While CAS
determined that the test itself was reliable and found that circumstances showed
that Veerpalu likely administered the HGH, the FIS decision was set aside
because FIS did not prove that the test’s decision limits were scientifically
correctly set. The CAS panel in turn overturned the three-year sanction imposed
by FIS.
Chantelle Kerry v. Ice Skating Australia27
Chantelle Kerry, an Australian figure skater, filed an appeal seeking a
declaration that Brooklee Han, another figure skater, was ineligible to be on the
Ice Skating Australia Olympic team for the Sochi Olympics in 2014. Kerry
argued that by Han’s competing in the Hershey Open 2013 Figure Skating
Competition in New York City made her ineligible to participate in the 2014
Olympics. CAS found that Han was eligible to participate in the 2014
Olympics.
Fernerbahçe SK v. UEFA28
Fernerbahçe SK (Club) is a professional football club in Istanbul, Turkey.
The Club appealed a decision handed down by the Union of European Football
Associations (UEFA) that excluded the Club from competition for a period of
two years. Prior to this decision UEFA had fined the Club and forced it to play
two matches behind closed doors as a result of Club supporters being destructive
and disruptive during the match. CAS found that UEFA was within its power
to impose a two-year probationary period and therefore upheld the sanction.
26. Verrpalu / Int’l Ski Federation (FIS) CAS 2011/A/2566.
27. Chantelle Kerry / Ice Skating Australia CAS 2013/A/3415.
28. Fernerbahçe SK / UEFA CAS 2013/A/3139.

SURVEY FORMATTED FINAL

496

6/4/2014 4:21 PM

MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:2

Viktor Troicki v. ITF29
Vikto Troicki is a 27-year-old Serbian professional tennis player. Troicki
had just lost in the first round of the Monte Carlo Rolex Masters Tournament
when he was notified that he had been randomly selected to be drug tested.
Troicki was asked to provide both a urine and blood sample. The blood sample
was to be tested for human growth hormone (HGH), specifically. Troicki
agreed to provide the urine sample, but refused to provide the blood sample
because he was unwell from the match he had just played.
Troicki went to the doping control station provided the urine sample, but
still refused the blood sample because he felt unwell and had a needle phobia.
The doctor taking the blood sample told him that if he did not sign the blood
sample form that he could face sanctions. Troicki signed the form because he
did not want to face sanctions and he then asked the doctor if it would be a
violation if he was unable to provide blood because he was unwell. The doctor’s
response is what is at issue in this case. Troicki claims that the doctor told him
that if he did not feel well he could write a letter to the personnel handling the
anti-doping control and the doctor denies it saying this. The tribunal sided with
the doctor’s version of the story and Troicki appealed to CAS. CAS suspended
Troicki for twelve months, disqualified his results from the Monte Carlo
Masters 2013, and all the prize money and ranking points obtained from his
participation in all competitions prior to July 15, 2013.
WADA v. Ivan Mauricio Casas Buritrago & GCD30
On May 29, 2012 Mauricio refused to submit to a drug test. On September
27, 2012, the Disciplinary Commission acquitted Mauricio of all allegations.
The national Anti-doping Agency of Colombia (NADA) appealed the decision
and then WADA requested the file to submit it on appeal. Mauricio argued that
the drug-testing did not meet the protocol procedures set forth by WADA
because the selection was not made at random and there was no list displayed
at the billboard at the finish line of his race.
However, CAS found that there was no compelling justification for the
athlete to refuse the drug test and in the absence of mitigating circumstances a
probationary period of two-years must be imposed. Mauricio was suspended
for two-years beginning at the issuance of the CAS decision and all his
competitive results between May 29, 2012.

29. Viktor Troicki / ITF CAS 2013/A/3279.
30. WADA / Ivan Mauricio Casas Buritrago & GCD CAS 2013/A/3077.
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WADA v. Lada Chernova & RUSADA31
Ms. Lada Chernova (Chernova), a Russian javelin thrower, had previously
failed a drug test on December 15, 2008, and was suspended for two years. On
February 29, 2013 Chernova again failed a drug test. On June 9, 2012, Russian
Anti-doping Agency (RUSADA) issued a decision imposing a life-time ban due
to her second anti-doping violation and Chernova appealed this ruling.
Chernova tried to argue that the laboratory’s analyst, Ms. Sokolova’s, signature
was forged and thus infringed on Article 5.2.6.6 of the WADA International
Standard for Laboratories (ISL).
CAS found that there was no credible departure from the ISL or any other
international regulation during Chernova’s drug testing period. Therefore, CAS
upheld the life-time ban issued by RUSADA and forced Chernova to forfeit all
competitive results in relation to competition on February 29, 2012.
DISCRIMINATION LAW
Many state and federal laws work together to protect individuals from
discrimination based on race, gender, age, religion, and disability, to name a
few. Discrimination claims are often based on the Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, Title VII of the Education Amendments of 1972, and the
Americans with Disabilities Act. The following cases illustrate the effect of
anti-discrimination laws in the sports context.
Heike v. Guevara32
The plaintiff, a Central Michigan University women’s basketball player,
filed an Equal Protection claim against the defendants alleging that her
scholarship was not renewed based on her race and sexual orientation. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found that the plaintiff did
not present direct evidence or a prima facie case of discrimination to support
her claim because she could neither prove that she was in a protected class nor
that the legitimate reasons for her dismissal were mere pretext. Furthermore,
Heike was not able to show that another similarly situated player was treated
differently as required to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.

31. WADA / Lada Chernova & RUSADA CAS 2013/A/3112.
32. No. 10–1728, 2013 WL 1092737 (6th Cir. Mar. 18, 2013).
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Mann v. Louisiana High Sch. Athletic Ass’n.33
The plaintiff in this case is the father of A.M., who is a high school student
in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. A.M. had to transfer schools because he was
diagnosed with anxiety disorder, which interfered with his performance at
school. He transferred to another school that could better accommodate his
condition. Because of the transfer, A.M. was subject to the Louisiana High
School Athletic Association’s (LSHAA) transfer rule, which renders a student
ineligible for one year from date of transfer. A.M. sat out six games of the 2011
football season because he was ineligible. In response, Mann filed a complaint
in federal court, alleging violations of the American with Disabilities Act
(ADA) and requesting injunctive relief. The district court granted a preliminary
injunction against the LSHAA to treat A.M. as eligible and to not impose the
restitution rule against A.M. or his school in event the injunction is later
reversed or vacated. On appeal, the court concluded that although learning,
concentrating, and thinking are major life activities under the ADA, Mann did
not connect the findings to any particular way that A.M. was substantially
limited in any of those life activities due to his disorder. Thus, the court reversed
the injunction because A.M. was not likely to succeed on the merits of his ADA
claim.
Starego v. N.J. State Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n.34
Plaintiff, a 19-year old autistic high school student and his parents sued the
New Jersey State Interscholastic Athletic Association (Association) under the
ADA, after the Association denied the student’s waiver to continue playing high
school football after his four-year participation limit expired. In their decision
to deny the student’s waiver, the Association claimed that since the student
received the full benefit of athletics participation in high school by participating
for four years, it would give the student’s high school an unfair advantage
having a college level player on their team.
In analyzing the case de novo with a small degree of deference to the
Association’s decision, the Court determined that the student was provided with
“equal access and opportunity to play football afforded to every other student
without a disability.”35 Therefore, the essence of the ADA was achieved and
the Association’s denial of the waiver deemed valid.

33. No. 12–264–JJB, 2013 WL 3475116 (N.D. La. Sept. 13, 2013).
34. No. 13–3172 (FLW), 2013 WL 4804821 (D. N.J. Sept. 9, 2013).
35. Id. at *13.
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Talevski v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.36
Plaintiff Anita Talevski suffers from bi-polar disorder. From late 2011 until
early 2012, Talevski participated in the University of California San Diego’s
(UCSD) triathlon program that was open to the general public. The UCSD
triathlon coaches knew about Talevski’s disorder. During this time, Talevski
stopped taking her medications and had occasional emotional outbursts. She
also developed an obsessive affection for another triathlon participant. The
UCSD director of recreation informed Talevski that her conduct violated the
triathlon program’s code of conduct and expelled her from the program.
Talevski brought a disability rights action against Regents of the University
of California (Regents) that alleged UCSD violated Title II of the ADA. The
United States District Court for the Southern District of California concluded
that participating in recreational programs that are open to the public does not
constitute a fundamental constitutional right. Therefore, the court dismissed
Talevski’s ADA claim and concluded that Regents was entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity.
EDUCATION LAW
Education law is an area of law that covers the laws and regulations that
govern federal and state education, including school athletics. High school
athletic associations and the NCAA both impose rules and regulations to govern
the conduct of student-athletes. The following cases involve challenges to
various rules and regulations that govern high school athletic associations and
the NCAA.
B.A. v. Miss. High Sch. Activities Ass’n Inc.37
The plaintiffs, a group of high school student-athletes, sought to enjoin the
high school association from enforcing its rule prohibiting student-athletes from
competing on both a school and non-school team in the same sport during the
academic year. The plaintiffs alleged a violation of the Equal Protection of
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution because the rule created two
classes of student-athletes: (1) a group that may associate with independent
teams and high school teams, allowing for more training in that sport; and (2) a
group that may associate with either their independent team or their high school
team, having limited opportunities for training and development in their sport.
The court applied the rational basis test to the rule since it does not discriminate

36. No. 13cv958JM (JMA), 2013 WL 4102202 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2013).
37. No. 1:13cv170–SA–DAS, 2013 WL 5676899 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 18, 2013).
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against a suspect class and found that the rule was reasonably related to
competitive balance among member schools. Thus, judgment as a matter of law
in favor of the association was proper.
Hinterberger v. Iroquois Sch. Dist.38
Plaintiff, a cheerleader, filed a lawsuit against the Iroquois School District
and a parent-volunteer coach who instructed and supervised the cheerleading
squad after plaintiff sustained a head injury during practice. On appeal, the
parent-volunteer coach seeks the reversal of District Court’s decision denying
the application of qualified immunity.
The court concluded that because the defendant’s conduct did not violate a
clearly established right, the district court erred in deciding in favor of the
plaintiff. Therefore the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity based on her
status as a volunteer coach for the district and released from liability.
Lavella v. Stockhausen39
Alexandria Lavella suffered a concussion while performing for the Peters
Township High School (PTHS) varsity cheerleading squad. Lavella’s
cheerleading coach, Chelsea Stochkausen, was aware of Lavella’s cocussion
and symptoms. Two weeks later, Lavella returned to cheerleading practice, was
struck in the head, and suffered concussion-like symptoms. Stochkausen
observed this injury, but did not file an injury report with PTHS. A week later,
during practice, Levalla suffered another concussion after a teammate fell onto
her head.
Lavella claims that Stockhausen violated her constitutional right to be free
from bodily harm. Because states do not have an obligation to protect their
citizens, Lavella pursued her constitutional claim through the four-pronged
“state-created danger theory.” Stockhausen claimed that Lavella failed the
second prong which requires proof that “the state-actor acted in willful disregard
for the Plaintiff’s safety.”40 The United States District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania concluded that Lavella did not satisfy the second
element because Lavella was medically cleared to participate in the two
cheerleading practices and she decided to participate in the cheerleading
practices.

38. No. 12–3875, 2013 WL 6284433 (3d Cir. Dec. 5, 2013).
39. No. 13cv0127, 2013 WL 1838387 (W.D. Pa. May 1, 2013).
40. Id. at *3.
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Rodriguez v. Unified Sch. Dist. 50041
In 2006, Michael Hitze was driving plaintiff Jesus Rodriquez, a student and
soccer player at Sumner Academy High School, to a Sumner soccer game when
Hitze’s vehicle crashed and severely injured Rodriquez. Rodriquez made a
claim for benefits under the Kansas State High School Athletic Association’s
(KSHSAA) catastrophic injury insurance policy which covered students
participating in “pre and post game-related activities. . .[including] individual
travel, for purposes of representing the Participating School, . . . provided the
travel is paid for or subject to reimbursement by the Participating school.”42
Mutual of Omaha Insurance Company denied Rodriquez’s claim for benefits
under KHSAA’s policy.
The Court of Appeals of Kansas interpreted the insurance policy to mean
that “only travel that is paid for or subject to reimbursement by the school
district is covered by th[e] policy.”43 Under this interpretation the court
determined that Rodriquez’s travel to the soccer game was not covered by
KHSAA’s insurance policy because his travel was not subject to
reimbursement. Based on the Unified School District 500’s policy, Rodriquez
was not entitled to reimbursement because Hitze was not over twenty-one years
old and Hitze did not verify insurance coverage with Sumner.
Scott v. Okla. Secondary Sch. Activities Ass’n.44
A student athlete sued his state high school athletic association seeking
declaratory judgment and permanent injunction, to prevent the association from
enforcing its eligibility ruling not allowing the plaintiffs and many of his
teammates to participate in the state football playoffs. The rule against paying
the fees for various individual camps in which plaintiff participated came into
effect after he and his teammates attended most of the individual camps at issue.
The defendant was able to confirm that plaintiff’s school paid for him and some
of his teammates to attend football camps. On plaintiff appeal directly to the
supreme court of Oklahoma the court ruled that the defendant’s decision was
arbitrary and capricious because it retroactively applied a rule that did not exist
for the majority of the alleged violations.

41.
42.
43.
44.

306 P.3d 327 (Kan. Ct. App. 2013).
Id. at 330.
Id. at 335.
313 P.3d 891 (Okla. 2013).
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Spirit Lake Tribe of Indians v. NCAA45
The University of North Dakota (UND) uses a Native American name—the
Fighting Sioux—and image as its logo and mascot. Members of the Spirit Lake
Tribe (SLT) and Standing Rock Tribe (SRT) approved UND’s Fighting Sioux
name in a 1969 ceremony. In 2005, the NCAA prohibited its member
institutions from displaying Native American images, mascots, and nicknames
at championship events. In 2007, UND and the NCAA agreed that UND could
retain the Fighting Sioux name without sanctions if SLT and SRT approved the
Fighting Sioux name. SLT brought this action to prohibit the NCAA from
sanctioning UND for its use of the Fighting Sioux name. SLT claimed that the
NCAA interfered with a protected activity by interfering with the contract
allegedly created during the 1969 ceremony. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the NCAA’s motion for summary
judgment because the 1969 ceremony did not create a contract.
Wright City Pub. Schs. v. Okla. Secondary Sch. Activities Ass’n46
The Oklahoma Secondary School Activities Association’s (OSSAA)
baseball regulations limit Oklahoma varsity baseball teams to twenty-two
games per season. When a varsity baseball team violates the twenty-two game
rule the OSSAA may: (1) place the team’s school on warning status; (2) place
the baseball team’s school on probation status; or (3) suspend the team’s school
from OSSAA membership. After playing twenty-two baseball games in the
2013 season, the Wright City Public School varsity baseball team (WCPS)
played two more five-inning games against two Oklahoma high school baseball
teams. For violating the twenty-game rule, the OSSAA required WCPS to
forfeit its next game, eliminating WCPS from the Oklahoma state baseball
tournament. The Wright City school board sought injunctive relief against this
penalty and claimed that the OSSAA arbitrarily or unreasonably imposed the
forfeiture against WCPS for violating the OSSAA’s baseball rule. The Supreme
Court of Oklahoma held that the OSAA’s forfeiture penalty against WCPS was
arbitrary.
EMPLOYMENT LAW
Employment law is a broad area that encompasses all areas of the
employer/employee relationship. Employment law is made up of thousands of
federal and state statutes. The following cases highlight various issues that

45. 715 F.3d 1089 (8th Cir. 2013).
46. 303 P.3d 884 (Okla. 2013).
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involve employment law in the realm of sports, such as whether coaches are
considered at-will employees, retirement benefits for former professional
athletes, and whether universities can be vicariously liable for their coaches.
Giles v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Ret. Plan47
A retired NFL player filed this lawsuit against the NFL Retirement Board
to have his medical impairments classified as arising out of League football
activities in order to qualify the plaintiff for Degenerative Football benefits
provided by the Leagues’ Retirement Plan. Conversely, defendants felt that the
plaintiff’s injuries stem from a mixture of League football activities, as well as
non-football activities outside of the League, therefore the resulting
impairments do not warrant the classification sought by the plaintiff. The Court
determined that the plain language of the NFL Player Retirement Plan allows
all players receiving Social Security benefits to qualify for League’s disability
benefits, but does not specify the classification of benefits applicable. However,
the Court found the denial of the plaintiff’s Degenerative Football benefits was
unreasonable based on the precedent established by the Retirement Board. As a
result, the plaintiff was granted summary judgment in his favor allowing for the
receipt of Football Degenerative benefits from the NFL Retirement Board.
Haywood v. Univ. of Pittsburgh48
A former University of Pittsburgh football coach filed claims of breach of
written contract, breach of oral contract, and various other state law claims
against his former employer, the University of Pittsburgh, after the University
terminated his employment agreement for cause following the plaintiff’s
involvement in a domestic dispute. The court determined that the University
acted reasonably and in good faith in determining that the plaintiff’s conduct
constituted just cause for termination. Additionally, the court concluded that
while a separate oral agreement existed in regards to the buyout payment with
the University of Miami, the determination that the plaintiff was rightfully
terminated with cause relieved the University from all obligations to the
plaintiff. Therefore, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendant University on the breach of written and oral contract claims.

47. No. ELH–12–634, 2013 WL 6909200 (D. Md. Dec. 31, 2013).
48. No. 11–1200, 2013 WL 5466958 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2013).
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Hernandez v. Nat’l Ins. Co.49
From 1995 until 2009, the University of Puerto Rico Bayamon employed
Pedro Rojas as its Olympic Wrestling coach for a series of ten-month periods,
starting in August and ending in May. During June and July, Rojas was not a
University employee, and the University’s athletic director told Rojas not to
train student-athletes. Jose Rey Hernandez was a student at the University and
a member of the Olympic Wrestling team. According to Hernandez, Rojas
required that he attend practices during the summer. At a wrestling practice in
June 2009, Hernandez injured his neck.
Hernandez sued the University’s insurance company, National Insurance
Company (NIC), and NIC’s successor, Puerto Rico Guaranty Association. All
of the defendants moved for summary judgment. The United States District
Court for the District of Puerto Rico considered whether the University, as Rojas
employer, was responsible for Rojas negligence even though Rojas was not
under contract with the University when Hernandez was injured. The court
found that a jury could determine that the University employed Rojas because
Rojas was acting as a University employee when Hernandez was injured.
Specifically, Rojas was partaking in his job’s primary function: coaching the
University’s Olympic wrestling team.
Hewitt v. Kerr50
The Rams fired Equipment Manager Todd Hewitt at the age of fifty-four.
Hewitt filed an age discrimination claim under the Missouri Human Rights Act.
Thereafter, the Rams moved to compel arbitration of Hewitt’s claims, according
to the arbitration provision in his employment contract. The court ruled that the
Commissioner has an ingrained potential for bias associated with the fact that
the NFL teams selected him to be Commissioner. For that reason, the court did
not believe that the arbitration provision provided for a fair and impartial
arbitration process, since Hewitt had limited bargaining power in accepting the
employment contract. Thus, the court held that the trial court will appoint an
arbitrator, which shall have the powers originally granted by the arbitration
provision.

49. 964 F. Supp. 2d 194 (D. P.R. 2013).
50. No. ED 100479, 2013 WL 5725992 (Mo. Ct. App. Oct. 22, 2013).
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Jones v. Alcorn State Univ.51
In 2008, Alcorn State University (ASU) gave Plaintiff Ernest Jones, ASU’s
head football coach, written notice of its intent to terminate his employment.
The notice described various incidents in which Jones engaged in footballrelated financial transactions without the proper authority and without following
proper procedures. Additionally, the notice informed Jones that he was entitled
to a hearing and to have an attorney at the hearing, but his attorney could not
present evidence or cross-examine witnesses. At the hearing, the ASU
Grievance Committee recommended to ASU’s president to terminate Jones’
employment. Jones argued that ASU did not provide him procedural due
process under Mississippi law because ASU did not allow his attorney to present
evidence or cross-examine witnesses at his hearing. The Mississippi Court of
Appeals found that ASU did not restrict Jones’ due-process rights because the
notice informed Jones that his attorney would not be able to cross-examine
witnesses or present evidence at the hearing. Moreover, the court noted, “An
adequate opportunity to be heard . . . does not require the procedural safeguards
of a trial.”52
GENDER EQUITY LAW
The most significant legislation for gender equality is Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972. Title IX has been the cornerstone for
generating athletic opportunities for women at both the high school and the
collegiate level. Title IX seeks to protect individuals from discrimination based
on sex in education programs or activities that receive federal financial
assistance. Title IX claims are prevalent in sports law and the following cases
demonstrate how Title IX claims can be brought against a high school or
university.
Beattie v. Line Mt. Sch. Dist.53
A Line Mountain School District policy would not allow seventh grader
A.B. to join the middle school wrestling team because she was female. After
A.B.’s parents’ petition to allow A.B. to join was denied, A.B.’s parents
challenged the District’s policy under on Equal Protection grounds. The
Pennsylvania Wrestling Club (PWC) filed a motion to intervene and claimed
that it had an interest in the lawsuit to protect A.B. from injuries that could result

51. 120 So.3d 448 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013).
52. Id. at 452.
53. No. 4:13–CV–02655, 2013 WL 6095488 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 20, 2013).
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from wrestling boys and inhibit her from fulfilling her future Olympic wrestling
career. PWC also claimed an interest based on a statutory mandate to “protect
the opportunity of any amateur athlete . . . to participate in amateur athletic
competition.”54
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
denied the Club’s intervention because its interest in the litigation was not
sufficiently specific or definite. Specifically, the Club’s interest in protecting
A.B. so that she may hopefully become an Olympian when eligible in 2024 was
too remote. The court also denied the Club’s statutory interest because A.B.’s
challenge fulfilled the statutes’ obligations.
Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ.55
The Second Circuit affirmed a district court ruling that Quinnipiac
University (Quinnipiac) has continued to fail in providing its female student
population with genuine athletic participation opportunities substantially
proportionate to the University’s female enrollment. In 2010, after Quinnipiac
announced its plans to eliminate the men’s volleyball, golf, and track programs,
as well as, engage in extensive roster management for other men’s teams, the
plaintiffs, Quinnipiac volleyball players, filed a lawsuit under Title IX. The
district court enjoined Quinnipiac from taking any action. In determining
whether to grant or deny Quinnipiac’s motion to lift the injunction, the district
court determined that Quinnipiac’s counting has continuously failed to achieve
substantial proportionality under the first prong of Title IX. Quinnipiac
maintained a 6.3% disparity in women’s athletic competition in relation to
men’s athletic competition, a factor of substantial proportionality. As a result,
the court denied Quinnipiac’s motion to lift the injunction.
McCully v. Stephenville Indep. Sch. Dist.56
In comparison to boys, females at Henderson Junior High (HJH) have fewer
athletic opportunities and are treated differently. Accordingly, the plaintiff sued
Stephenville Independent School District (SISD) for allegedly violating Title
IX. As a result of the lawsuit, the plaintiff claims that the defendants retaliated
against his daughter, M. McCully, by forcing M. McCully off the HJH
basketball team. The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Texas dismissed the plaintiff’s retaliation claim against SISD because the
plaintiffs failed to allege facts sufficient to infer a right to recovery.
54. Id. at *1.
55. 928 F. Supp. 2d 414 (D. Conn. 2013).
56. No. 4:13-CV-702-A, 2013 WL 6017368 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 13, 2013).
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Moss v. Franklin Cnty. Bd. of Educ.57
In 2011, plaintiff Amy Moss, a high school physical education teacher,
applied for a Girls Softball and Girls Basketball coaching position at a different
high school, but was not granted an interview or chosen for the positions.
Instead, with the support of a Franklin County Board of Education (Franklin)
member, a male teacher filled the vacant coaching positions before the positions
were posted online. Moss claimed that Franklin violated Title VII by
discriminating against her on the basis of gender. The United States District
Court for the Northwestern District of Alabama found that Franklin had a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for hiring the male teacher; namely, that
the teacher lived and grew up in the high school’s community.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Intellectual property rights are important in the sports industry. Intellectual
property rights help secure economic value in sport and merchandising and
licensing agreements generate billions of dollars in revenue every year. The
following decisions discuss a range of cases involving teams and individual’s
intellectual property rights and the extent to which the court will protect those
rights.
Action Ink, Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.58
This is a trademark infringement and unfair competition case, which arose
out of a dispute between a sport marketing firm Action Ink, Inc. (Action) and
Anheuser-Busch (Anheuser). In 1985, Action received a trademark for the
“THE ULTIMATE FAN” (the Mark) with the purpose of promoting goods
and/or services by having fans compete in contests at sporting events. Action’s
president, Michael Eckstein, met with several NBA teams to hold the Mark
contests.
The first interaction between the parties occurred in 1988, when Action
requested Anheuser to stop using the phrase “THE ULTIMATE CUBS FAN
BUD MAN SEARCH” at Cubs games. Action renewed the Mark in 2005. In
2009, Action sent a cease and desist letter to Anheuser in relation to its
promotion, “BudLight/Washington Redskins Ultimate Fan Sweepstakes.” In
September 2011, Action learned that Anheuser used the phrase “Ultimate Fan
Experience” during a Bud Light promotion during commercial aired during
NFL games. In November 2011, Action sent a cease and desist letter to

57. No. CV-12-J-3811-NW, 2013 WL 6019470 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 13, 2013).
58. 959 F. Supp. 2d 934 (E.D. La. 2013).
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Anheuser to which Anheuser responded that it was not infringing the Mark.
Finally, on January 19, 2012 Action sued Anheuser for trademark infringement
and false designation under the Lanham Action and violation of state law.
The court concluded that the mark is suggestive because the “Ultimate Fan”
could either refer to the greatest fan of a team or it could refer to an individual
who wins a contest among fans. A suggestive mark is not afforded the higher
protection of an “arbitrary” or “fanciful” mark, thus this factor does not favor a
likelihood of confusion. Lastly, Action did not provide the court with any
evidence of actual confusion. Therefore, the court held that Action could not
maintain its action for trademark infringement.
Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc.59
Nike sued Already alleging that its athletic shoe lines “Sugars” and “Soulja
Boys” violated Nike’s Air Force 1 trademark. Already filed a counterclaim that
the Air Force 1 trademark is invalid. Four months after Already filed its counter
claim, Nike issued a Covenant not to sue. The covenant stated that Nike would
not bring claims against Already or any of its affiliates for trademark
infringement or unfair competition claims stemming from Already’s existing
footwear designs. Nike then moved to dismiss its claims with prejudice and to
dismiss Already’s counterclaim. Already opposed the dismissal of its
counterclaim because Nike had not established that its covenant mooted the
case. Already had intentions of introducing new versions of its shoe lines and
potential investors wanted Nike’s trademark to be invalidated before they would
invest. The District Court dismissed Already’s counterclaim and the second
circuit affirmed.
The Supreme Court began its analysis by examining the terms of the
covenant. The Court found that the covenant was unconditional and irrevocable
and reaches to prohibit Nike from making any claim or demand. Furthermore,
Already failed to assert an intent to market a shoe that would result in
infringement. The Court upheld the Court of Appeals dismissal and concluded
that the “‘covenant renders the threat of litigation remote or nonexistent’
because it could not envision a shoe that would be within Nike’s trademark yet
not protected by the covenant.”60

59. 133 S.Ct. 721 (2013).
60. Id. at 733.
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Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Ltd. P’ship61
Frank Bouchat sought to recover damages from the Baltimore Ravens in
reaction to the use of Bouchat’s “Flying B” logo by the Ravens. Bouchat had
previously litigated several lawsuits pertaining to the Ravens’ use of the logo,
including the initial confirmation of trademark infringement against the Ravens.
The Ravens asserted the fair use defense against Bouchat’s current claims. The
Fourth Circuit determined that the Ravens’ use of the logo in the videos
constituted fair use and did not establish infringement on the part of the Ravens.
Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc.62
Jim Brown alleged that EA Sports violated the Lanham Act through the use
of Brown’s likeness in EA’s Madden NFL series of football video games. The
court ruled that Brown’s likeness is artistically relevant because it is important
in recreating one of the teams in the game and he is one of the all-time greatest
players, and that Brown’s evidence did not allege that EA misled consumers as
to his involvement with the game.
Cross Fit, Inc. v. Maximum Human Performance, LLC.63
CrossFit, Inc. sought a preliminary injunction requiring Maximum Human
Performance, LLC (MHP) to cease and remove its “X-Fit Workout Series”
fitness videos and any other such videos available on the internet that state or
imply an affiliation with CrossFit, and to remove any use of “X-Fit” from its
website or social media relating to exercise instruction. The court found that
there was sufficient evidence that consumers are likely to associate the “X” in
“X-Fit” as a short form for “Cross” as it is commonly used by the general public
in that context and that CrossFit is likely to suffer irreparable harm in losing
control of its reputation and loss of good will without injunctive relief. Thus,
the balance of hardships are in favor of CrossFit because both companies
operate in the same domain and the danger lies in the potential confusion of
customers will have in associating “X-Fit” to CrossFit or the X-Fit brand.
Therefore, the court granted CrossFit’s motion of preliminary injunction.

61. 737 F.3d 932 (4th Cir. 2013).
62. 724 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 2013).
63. No. 12cv2348-BTM-MDD, 2013 WL 1627953 (S.D. Cal. April 12, 2013).
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Dryer v. NFL64
This case is about former NFL players who contend that the NFL violated
their common-law and statutory rights of publicity. The parties reached a
settlement, which provided for a fund that will distribute payments to assist
former players and their families, and for a licensing agency to market former
players’ publicity rights. Despite the benefits of the settlement, a group of
plaintiffs opposed the agreement. They argued that the district court erred
because the settlement requires an impermissible cy pres distribution of
settlement proceeds. Also, they argued that the Plaintiffs supporting the
settlement failed to procure the maximum amount of money that the NFL could
pay.
The court stated that the certification of a class action is highly doubtful and
absent a class action it is unlikely any single plaintiff’s claims is so valuable to
be worth engaging in continued litigation if this case is not resolved now. The
court also stated that the merits of the case weigh in favor of settling this matter
now. The fact that the case has gone on for three years and the further expense
of litigation also weighs in favor of a resolution. The last factor is not an issue
because the NFL was able to pay any judgment against it.
Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc. 65
As a NCAA Division I student-athlete, Ryan Hart was included in
Electronic Arts, Inc.’s (EA) NCAA Football videogame franchise. Hart’s NCAA
Football digital avatar could be found on his former collegiate football team,
playing Hart’s collegiate position, wearing his collegiate number, weighing his
same weight, and height. Hart alleged that EA violated his right of publicity
under New Jersey law for using his biographical information and likeness in
NCAA Football. Applying the Transformative Use Test to balance EA’s First
Amendment Right of free expression against Hart’s right of publicity, the Third
Circuit concluded that NCAA Football did not sufficiently transform Hart’s
identity to avoid Hart’s right publicity claim.
Hockey Club of the Ohio Valley, LLC v. Eagle Mktg. Group66
The Hockey Club of the Ohio Valley and the ECHL filed a claim of
trademark infringement against Eagle Marketing, alleging that Eagle Marketing
engaged in unauthorized use of its trademark in order to solicit and sell

64. No. 09-2181 (PAM/AJB), 2013 WL 1408351 (D. Minn. April 8, 2013).
65. 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013).
66. No. 5:12cv161, 2013 WL 6524719 (N.D. W.Va. Dec. 12, 2013).
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marketing advertisements to local retailers. The plaintiffs requested actual and
treble damages, as well as, attorney and court fees as relief.
Ultimately, the court granted the request for relief. In coming to this
conclusion, the court found that because the defendant had previously engaged
in such behavior and received a cease and desist letter based on the prior
infringement, Eagle Marketing knew of the illegality of its actions. Therefore,
the plaintiffs were awarded all requested damages.
La. Athletics Down on the Bayou, LLC v. Bayou Bowl Ass’n67
The Bayou Bowl Association (BBA) hired Brian Rigby, owner of Louisiana
Athletics Down on the Bayou, LLC to help start the first Bayou Bowl. Among
other things, Rigby organized hotel rooms, collected shoe and T-shirt sizes, and
met with players’ parents. After the first Bayou Bowl in 2003, the BBA fired
Rigby.
Rigby brought a trademark infringement action against BBA and claimed
that he created the Bayou Bowl name and concept. To determine if BBA
committed trademark infringement, the district court considered whether Rigby
satisfied the Lanham Act’s use requirement. The court determined that Rigby
did not satisfy the use requirement because: (1) Rigby never used the title
“Bayou Bowl” in commerce; (2) Rigby has not planned or held an event titled
Bayou Bowl before meeting with the BBA; and (3) nothing suggests that Rigby
ever used Bayou Bowl outside of his preparation for the 2003 football game.
Masck v. Sports Illustrated68
Brian Masck filed a copyright infringement claim against multiple
defendants for unauthorized use of a photo Masck took of Desmond Howard’s
iconic “Heisman Pose” that Howard did after he scored versus Ohio State in
1991. As a result of the action and at issue before the court was Desmond
Howard’s counterclaim, alleging Masck violated his right of publicity under
Florida law and the Lanham Act on the theory that Masck’s use gives the public
a false impression that Masck’s products are associated with Howard in some
way.
The court concluded that Howard’s Florida law claim is barred by Florida’s
four-year statute of limitations period because Howard’s claim was fifteen years
past due, since the photo was first published in 1991. Regarding the Langham
Act, Masck alleged Howard failed to state a valid claim because Masck’s
website and his products were not literally false. A publication must be literally
67. No. 11–303–BAJ–SCR, 2013 WL 2102354 (M.D. La. May 14, 2013).
68. No. 13–cv–10226 2013 WL 3810305 (E.D. Mich. July 23, 2013).
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false to violate the Lanham Act, but a literally true statement could still convey
a false message. Therefore, the court did not dismiss Howard’s claim because
the use of his picture and likeness on Masck’s website provides a misleading
representation.
Tovey v. Nike, Inc.69
In 2005, Edward Tovey conceived an idea about a clothing line named
“BOOM YO!,” which he shared with Savannah Brinson, the girlfriend of NBA
player Lebron James, in hopes of creating a partnership with James and James’
sponsor Nike. In 2009, Tovey was granted a trademark for “BOOM YO” on
apparel. Tovey created shirts with “BOOM” on the front and “YO” on the
reverse. In 2010, Nike started a marketing campaign featuring the line
“BOOM,” on its apparel.
The district court granted Nike’s motion to dismiss Tovey’s federal
trademark counterfeiting claim because no willful intent on behalf of Nike was
proven. The court denied Nike’s motion to dismiss Tovey’s infringement claim
because the average sports apparel consumer could mistake Nike’s apparel for
Tovey’s apparel if the consumer did not look at the back of Tovey’s apparel.
Finally, the court denied Nike’s fair use defense because Nike could not
establish that it used “BOOM” in good faith, as a reasonable trier of fact could
determine that Brinson told James of Tovey’s idea and James gave the idea to
Nike.
LABOR LAW
Labor law governs the relationship between employers and employees who
are unionized or are seeking to unionize. Federal labor law continues to have a
significant impact on the sports industry as each of the major U.S. professional
sports leagues is unionized. Through these unions, professional athletes
negotiate CBAs with their respective leagues. Because a majority of American
professional athletes are union members, many of the labor law claims in sports
arise out of a dispute concerning a particular sport’s CBA.
Eller v. NLFPA70
Retired NFL players filed a class action lawsuit against the NFL Players
Association (NFLPA), its executive director, and certain plaintiff’s from Brady
v. NFL, claiming that the defendants: (1) wrongfully barred the retirees from

69. No. 1:12CV448 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 6, 2013).
70. 731 F.3d 752 (8th Cir. 2013).
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settlement negotiations; (2) negotiated on the retirees behalf without authority
to do so; and (3) agreed to a settlement concerning the new CBA with fewer
benefits than the retirees would have been able to attain for themselves. The
Eighth Circuit concluded that the retired players could not negotiate with the
NFLPA due to the non-statutory labor exemption and lacked standing under
federal labor laws. Also, the court determined that the defendants did not
improperly interfere with any economic advantage. Ultimately, the court found
that the retirees failed to allege facts to support their claims and dismissed the
action.
Vilma v. Goodell71
New Orleans Saints player Jonathan Vilma brought claims of libel, slander,
and intentional infliction of emotional distress against NFL Commission Rodger
Goodell for the statements Goodell made regarding Vilma’s involvement in the
Saints’ bounty program that targeted certain opposing players to injure. Goodell
moved to dismiss Vilma’s claim and the district court granted the motion. The
court found that: (1) the Labor Management Relations act preempted Vilma’s
claim; (2) the dispute instead needed to be resolved by the “mandatory, binding
dispute resolution procedures of the [CBA]”72; and (3) Vilma’s claims were
inadequately pled.
TAX LAW
Generally, tax law involves the rules that regulate federal and state taxation,
which are derived from the U.S Constitution, statutes, and common law. While
tax law plays a significant role in the sports industry, particularly professional
sports, this area of law is rarely litigated.
Capital Gymnastics Booster Club, Inc. v. C.I.R.73
Capital Gymnastics Booster Club (CGBC) was created to raise funds for
local competitive gymnastics teams to participate in competitions. As an entity
that fostered amateur sports competition, CGBC was exempt from paying
Federal income taxes under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.
CGBC member families paid CGBC annual dues and a $600 to $1400
assessment to cover competitions costs. CGBC gave families the option to
fundraise money to pay the yearly assessments costs. CGBC awarded

71. 917 F. Supp. 2d 591 (E.D. La. 2013).
72. Id. at 593.
73. 106 T.C.M. (CCH) 154 (T.C. 2013).

SURVEY FORMATTED FINAL

514

6/4/2014 4:21 PM

MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:2

fundraising parents points “in proportion to the fundraising profit that each
family generated.”74 CGBC would reduce a family’s assessment costs by the
number points a family earned.
In 2005, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) determined that
CGBC’s income benefited private individuals and was thus used for a private
purpose. Accordingly, CGBC violated the internal revenue code and CIR
revoked CGBC’s tax-exempt status. The U.S. Tax Court concluded that CGBC
was not operating exclusively for a tax-exempt purpose because it promoted it’s
fundraising members’ financial interests, a non-public interests. Specifically,
the court noted that CGBC’s point system benefited the child-athlete families
who were fundraising members, but not the child-athletes generally.
Accordingly, the Tax Court determined that CGBC did not satisfy section 501
(c)(3) and was no longer entitled to the tax exemption.
TORT LAW
Tort law is a heavily litigated area in sports law. Tort law governs the duty
of care an individual owes to co-participants and spectators, as well as, a duty
of care facility owners owe to its users. Typically courts will look to see if the
risk was inherent to participation and participants assumed the risk. Another
area of tort law involves the negligence of coaches. The cases that follow
represent tort issues involving spectators, coaches, athletes, and co-participants.
Cann v. Stefanec75
The parties, both members of the UCLA swim team, were engaged in a team
weight-lifting session in the University weight room when Stefanec lost her
balance and dropped a weighted bar on Cann’s head. The court found that the
classification of whether the parties were engaged in sport or recreation did not
alter the application of the doctrine of primary assumption of risk. Additionally,
the court determined that the since the parties were engaged in a necessary
activity of their participation on the UCLA swim team, primary assumption of
the risk is applicable to lifting weights, and the injury therefore became inherent
to participation. Consequently, Cann’s negligence claim was barred.

74. Id.
75. 158 Cal. Rptr. 3d 474 (Ct. App. 2013).
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Herman v. Lifeplex, LLC76
While playing tennis at an indoor tennis facility operated by Lifeplex, LLC,
Samuel Herman sustained injuries from slipping on a water bottle that was
hidden behind a curtain on Herman’s tennis court. Herman brought an action
against Lifeplex to recover damages for his personal injuries.
Lifeplex argued that Herman assumed the inherent risk of playing indoor
tennis and that it did not have actual or constructive notice of the water bottle’s
location. On appeal, the Supreme Court of New York reversed the trial courts
decision to grant Lifeplex’s motion for summary judgment because: (1) issues
of fact remained in regards to whether the water bottle was concealed or within
the playing area of Herman’s tennis court; and (2) Lifeplex did not provide
evidence demonstrating when Herman’s tennis court was last inspected or
cleaned.
Holzhausen v. Bi-State Dev. Agency77
Julie Holzhausen was injured when she fell off an embankment located on
the premises owned by the St. Louis Cardinals. Holzhausen reached the
embankment by climbing around a set of pipes to watch the St. Louis Cardinals
2006 World Series victory parade. Holzhausen claimed that the Cardinals
should have anticipated the harm created by the drop off given the distraction
posed by the large crowds that accompany parades. The court determined that
a distraction exception did not apply because the Cardinals had no reason to
expect that Holzhausen would climb over large pipes and be so distracted by the
parade that Holzhuasen would not see the drop off. Additionally, the court
determined that a reasonable person would recognize the risking of falling from
the drop off would outweigh the advantage of gaining a better view of the
parade.
Jahn v. Monroe Bd. of Educ.78
Spencer Jahn, a member of the Mausk High School boy’s swimming team,
brought a negligence claim against the Monroe Board of Education and Tom
Harkins, the head swimming coach (the defendants), for injuries Jahn suffered
before a swim meet. Jan alleged that Harkins failed to supervise a warm-up drill
where he instructed the swim team to dive into a pool and swim several lengths.
While participating in the drill, another swim team member dove into the pool

76. 966 N.Y.S.2d 473 (App. Div. 2013).
77. 414 S.W.3d 488 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013).
78. No. CW36032218S, 2013 WL 4504826 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 2, 2013).
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and struck Jahn, causing injuries to his head and neck. The court determined
that Jahn was not subject to imminent harm because his membership on the
swim team was voluntary—swim team participation occurred after school hours
and required a participation fee payment. The court rejected Jahn’s argument
that participating in the team drill was mandatory by drawing a distinction
between required participation and mandatory participation.
Moore v. Town of Billerica79
A mother of injured infant sued the Town of Billerica under Massachusetts
recreational use statute for negligent maintenance of public property. Plaintiff’s
child was injured after being hit with a baseball that came from an adjacent
baseball field, which was also owned by the Town.
The Town claimed that it was immune from the application of the
recreational use statute because the claim was based on the Town’s failure to
prevent injury, which section 10(j) of Massachusetts recreational use statute
strictly prohibits. Moore argued that her claim was based on the Town’s failure
to maintain safe conditions in the park where her child was injured. In
disagreeing with Moore’s position, the court stated that the Town was granted
immunity under the recreational use statute because the persons causing the
injury were engaged in recreation and were not willful, wanton, or reckless in
their activities. Therefore, the Town’s inaction in preventing the injury did not
serve as an exception to the grant of immunity.
Nathans v. Offerman80
Jonathan Nathan, a professional baseball catcher for the Bridgeport
Bluefish, sued Jose Offerman, a professional baseball player for the Long Island
Ducks, and Offerman’s team for injuries Offerman inflicted upon Nathan during
a summer professional baseball game. After a pitch hit Offerman, Offerman
charged the pitchers mound with his baseball bat in hand. Nathan followed
Offerman towards the pitchers mound where Offerman swung his bat and hit
Nathan’s head.
The Ducks moved for summary judgment against Nathan’s claims and
argued that it cannot be vicariously liable because Offerman’s actions were
outside the course and scope of his employment as a professional baseball
player. The Ducks also claimed that Offerman cannot be liable because Nathan
was a co-participant during the baseball game, a contact sport.
The district court denied the Ducks’ summary judgment motion against
79. 989 N.E.2d 540 (Mass. App. Ct. 2013).
80. 922 F. Supp. 2d 271 (D. Conn. 2013).
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vicarious liability because Offerman’s actions occurred within the Ducks time
and space limits. The court also determined that a jury could find that charging
the mound, with a baseball bat in hand, amounted to assault and battery, but a
jury could also find that it was foreseeable that a professional baseball batter
would charge a pitcher after being struck by a pitch. Thus, the question of
liability was left for the jury.
Pelham v. Bd. of Regents81
During a March 2008 practice, Georgia Southern University’s head football
coach lined his players “up in two single file lines facing each other”82 and
ordered them to fight each other on his command. The fights’ purpose was to
determine which players would make the team and become eligible for
scholarships. As a result of his fight, Jerome Pelham suffered severe injuries to
his right leg.
A trial court dismissed Pelham’s negligence claims against the University.
Pelham appealed and argued that his negligence claim was not barred by
Georgia sovereign immunity under the assault and battery exception. The
Georgia appellate court held that sovereign immunity barred Pelham’s claims
because Georgia’s anti-hazing statutes did not contain language explicitly
waiving sovereign immunity. Additionally, the court held that Georgia’s assault
and battery exception barred Pelham’s negligence claims because the fight with
a teammate caused his injuries, not his head coach’s orchestration of the fight.
Pippen v. NBCUniversal Media83
When news organizations learned about former Chicago Bulls great Scottie
Pippen’s financial difficulties, the organizations inaccurately reported that
Pippen filed for bankruptcy. Pippen claimed that the news organizations’
inaccurate reporting defamed him and his ability to make a living through
personal appearances and product endorsements.
The Seventh Circuit considered whether the news organization’s reports
constituted defamation per se or defamation per quod under Illinois law. The
court concluded that the news organizations reports did not constitute
defamation per se or per quod because incorrect bankruptcy accusations do not
fully ruin reputations given that there are many innocent reasons for financial
difficulties. Moreover, inaccurate bankruptcy reports do not imply that Pippen
lacked the ability to perform his jobs as a Chicago Bulls ambassador, basketball
81. 743 S.E.2d 469 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013).
82. Id. at 471.
83. 734 F.3d 610 (7th Cir. 2013).
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analyst, and product endorser.
Rispoli v. Long Beach Union Free Sch. Dist.84
Steven Rispoli was injured while competing in a high school wresting
match when he fell on the mat. Rispoli claimed that negligent refereeing caused
his injury because the referee failed to stop the match when Rispoli and his
opponent “entered into a potentially dangerous position, even though the referee
had previously stopped the match under the same circumstances.”85
The court found that Rispoli assumed the risk of injury presented in the
wrestling match by voluntarily participating in the sport, thereby consenting to
any commonly appreciated risks that were inherent to wrestling. Moreover, the
court found that the dangerous wrestling position that injured Rispoli was
considered potentially dangerous for Rispoli’s opponent, not Rispoli. Therefore,
failing to stop the wrestling match did not unreasonably increase Rispoli’s risk
of injury.
Squires v. Breckenridge Outdoor Educ. Ctr.86
Kimberly Squires was on a ski trip hosted by the Breckenridge Outdoor
Education Center (BOEC), an organization that provides children with
disabilities outdoors adventures. Prior to the trip, BOEC sent Squires and her
parents a welcome letter and liability release, which Squires and her mother read
and signed. On the first day of skiing, another skier collided with the tethers
connecting an instructor to Squires. The collision caused Squires’ instructor to
let go of the tethers, and Squires continued skiing unrestrained into a tree.
Squires filed an action against BOEC claiming that BOEC’s liability release
was unenforceable and that her mother’s consent to the release was not
voluntary or informed because her mother did not comprehend the risks
associated with Squires skiing with an instructor. The Tenth Circuit determined
that BOEC’s release was enforceable because it contained unambiguous and
clear language that demonstrated Squires’ mother intended to release BOEC
from any negligence claims. Additionally, the court determined that Squires’
mother’s consent was voluntary and informed because her mother had enough
information to evaluate the risks of skiing and did not inquire about those risks.

84. 975 N.Y.S.2d 107 (App. Div. 2013).
85. Id. at 108.
86. 715 F.3d 867 (10th Cir. 2013).
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Suitos v. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist.87
Chelsea Suitos suffered a brain injury when a softball struck her helmet
during a high school softball game. Suitos alleged that the Elk Grove Unified
School District negligently provided her a defective helmet that was insufficient
to protect her head from softballs. The court found that the School District
demonstrated that it did not breach a duty of care because Suitos, and the umpire
at the game, examined the helmet before the game and did not notice any
defects. Additionally, the court found that Suitos did not demonstrate that her
helmet was defective.
Tadmor v. N.Y. Jiu Jitsu, Inc.88
Erez Tadmor injured his left knee while sparring with another student
during his first advanced mixed martial arts (MMA) class. Although the other
student was bigger, Tadmor was relatively experienced at martial arts having
sparred for almost two months in a beginner class. Additionally, Tadmor
received combat training as an air marshal for the Israeli army.
The New York appellate corut reversed the lower court’s ruling, which
denied the defendant New York Jiu Jitsu’s motion for summary judgment. The
court reasoned that Tadmor assumed the risk because participating in the
advanced MMA class was voluntary, and suffering a knee injury was a
reasonably foreseeable consequence of participating in MMA.
UCF Athletics Ass’n Inc. v. Plancher89
During a University of Central Florida football practice, football player
Ereck Plancher collapsed and died after participating in conditioning drills.
Plancher’s parents brought a negligence action against the University and its
athletic association. A jury trial found the athletic association liable for
Plancher’s death and awarded Plancher’s parents $10 million. The athletic
association appealed and argued that the trial court incorrectly determined that
the athletic association was not entitled to limited sovereign immunity.
On appeal, the court considered whether the athletic association was a
“corporation primarily acting as an instrumentality of the [university],”90 and
thus immune from liability under Florida’s state agency sovereign immunity
laws. The court found that the athletic association acted primarily as an

87.
88.
89.
90.

No. CO70377, 2013 WL 4460707 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 19, 2013).
970 N.Y.S.2d 777 (App. Div. 2013).
121 So.3d 1097 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
Id. at 1103.
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instrumentality of the university, and was thus entitled to immunity, because the
athletic association was completely controlled by and intertwined with the
University. The court therefore reversed the trial court and remanded for further
proceedings.
Univ. of Tex. at Arlington v. Williams91
The Texas Court of Appeals affirmed a decision holding the University of
Texas at Arlington (UTA) liable for injuries suffered by plaintiff at its stadium.
The plaintiff, who was at the stadium watching her daughter’s soccer game, was
classified as a spectator. The UTA, a governmental entity, would generally be
shielded from liability under Texas’ recognition of sovereign immunity, but
under Texas law, the defense is waived for governmental entities for certain tort
claims, including a premises defects, if gross negligence or malicious intent can
be proved by the plaintiff.
The court declined to apply Texas’ Recreational Use statute, due to the fact
that the plaintiff was not engaged in a recreational activity at the time of her
accident. The court noted that neither watching a sporting event nor exiting the
premise constituted “recreational” activity and UTA could be liable for the
plaintiff’s injuries under theories of gross negligence. Ultimately, the court
determined that UTA was liable for the plaintiff’s injuries due their failure to
warn and requisite knowledge of dangerous conditions.
U.S. ANTI-DOPING AGENCY
The U.S. Anti-Doping Agency (USADA) is the national anti-doping
organization in the United States responsible for drug testing and imposing
sanctions for positive test results of athletes in the U.S. Olympic and Paralympic
movement. USADA was formed in 2000 and aims to preserve the integrity of
competition. The following decisions deal with athletes’ punishment after
failing a drug test.
USADA v. Klineman92
Alexandra Klineman entered into arbitration with the USADA to determine
whether she had used performance-enhancing drugs in strict violation of the
WADA Code. Klineman had taken multi-vitamins that triggered positive test
in the past. The arbitration panel concluded that the defendant’s fault was slight
in this manner because she did not exhibited intentional or deceitful conduct in

91. No. 02-12-00425-CV, 2013 WL 1234878 (Tex. App. Mar. 28, 2013).
92. AAA No. 77 190 00462 13 JENF (2013).
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taking the multi-vitamins and the supplements were not of the sports
performance enhancing variety. Therefore, Klineman’s case warranted a
reduction in penalty to thirteen months.
USADA v. Meeker93
Richard Meeker tested positive for a USADA prohibited substances after a
2012 cycling race. Meeker testified that he ingested supplements before or
during the race, but that he inadvertently ingested the prohibited substances with
no negligence or fault because there was an unknown contamination in one of
his supplements. Therefore, Meeker argued that the standard two-year
ineligibility sanction should be reduced or eliminated.
At arbitration the only issue was the length of Meeker’s period of
ineligibility. The arbitration panel found that Meeker failed to meet his burden
of having an explanation that “more likely than not” explained how the banned
substances entered his body. Because Meeker failed to demonstrate how the
banned substance entered his system, the arbitration panel applied the standard
two-year ineligibility sanction.
WORKERS COMPENSATION
Worker’s compensation laws were created for timely payment of medical
expenses, lost wages, and even permanent disability to workers sustaining
injuries on the job or injuries stemming from performing the job. The following
cases demonstrate the complexities of worker’s compensation because of the
interrelationship of the player’s contract and the leagues collective bargaining
agreement.
Battles v. WCAB (Pittsburgh Steelers Sports, Inc.)94
Ainsley Battles tore his hamstring playing in a football game for the
Pittsburgh Steelers. Battles’ missed the entire season as he underwent hamstring
surgery and rehab. The Steelers paid Battles $205,000, the contractual amount
owed to Battles in the event he missed the season because of an injury. After
doctors determined that Battles’ hamstring healed enough to play football again,
the Steelers chose not to resign him and Battles was unable to secure a spot on
any other NFL team.
Battles filed an unsuccessful petition with the Workers Compensation
Appeal Board for total disability benefits and claimed that his injury diminished

93. AAA No. 77 190 00335 13 (2013).
94. 82 A.3d 477 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2013).
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his athletic abilities so much that he could not make a NFL team roster. The
court affirmed the Appeal Board’s holding because Battles did not prove that
his hamstring injury resulted in a loss of earnings. Specifically, the court noted
that Battles did not lose any earnings because the Steelers paid Battles the
$205,000 he was contractually owed. Moreover, the court found Battles did not
establish that he suffered a compensable disability because testimony at the
Appeals Board hearing indicated that Battle’s injury did not prevent him from
making a professional football team; rather, other market forces caused his
unemployment.
Campbell v. New Orleans Saints95
Daniel Campbell injured his right knee at a mini-camp for the New Orleans
Saints. The Saints placed Campbell on the team’s injured reserve list, ultimately
ending Campbell’s professional football career. In accordance with Campbell’s
contract, the Saints paid Campbell $525 per week from the time of his injury
until the team’s first regular season game, and $335,000 over the course of the
team’s regular season.
Two years later, Campbell signed a consulting contract with the Miami
Dolphins. Soon after, Campbell filed a claim for temporary total disability
benefits with the Office of Workers’ Compensation (OWC). The OWC
concluded that Campbell was not eligible for disability payments because he
was able “to earn wages equal to 90% of his pre-injury wages.”96
Campbell appealed the OWC’s decision and claimed that the OWC imposed
an improper burden to determine his eligibility for disability payments by
considering his $525 per week payment, instead of his $335,000 payment, in its
disability payment calculation. The Louisiana appellate court affirmed the
OWC’s decision because the only significant financial figure used to determine
a disability claimant’s benefit eligibility is the amount the claimant was earning
when he was injured.
Fed. Ins. Co. v. WCAB (Johnson)97
The WNBA team, the Connecticut Sun, and its insurer filed a writ of review
to determine whether a California Worker’s Compensation Board possessed
jurisdiction to adjudicate the worker’s compensation claim of the team’s former
player. The plaintiffs claimed that sufficient contacts with California did not
exist in order for the Board to have jurisdiction over the claim.
95. 113 So.3d 1215 (La. Ct. App. 2013).
96. Id. at 1216.
97. 165 Cal. Rptr. 3d 288 (Ct. App. 2013).
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The court concluded that the Board did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate
the former player claim because she did not have sufficient contacts within the
state. In coming to its decision, the court stated, “The effects of participating in
one of 34 games do not amount to a cumulative injury warranting the invocation
of California law.”98 Therefore, the case was remanded with instructions to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
Gridiron Mgt. Group, LLC v. Travelers Indemnity Co.99
In 2007, Gridiron Management Group, LLC (GMG) purchased the Omaha
Beef indoor football team from Omaha Beef, LLC. GMG was a new entity
formed solely to operate the Omaha Beef football team. In 2008, GMG applied
for worker’s compensation insurance from defendant Travelers Indemnity Co.
Although new businesses are assigned the lowest possible premium, GMG was
assigned a higher premium because the National Council on Compensation
Insurance determined that, based on its rules, GMG was Omaha Beef’s
successor entity. The Supreme Court of Nebraska determined that GMG was a
successor entity to Omaha Beef, and therefore not entitled to the new business
premiums because like Omaha Beef, GMG’s business was operating the Omaha
Beef football team.
NFLPA v. NFLMC100
This case arises from a dispute in 2005, where the NFL Players Association
(NFLPA) received an arbitration award mandating a time offset. The NFLPA
then sought a confirmation of the award by the district court, which was granted.
Despite the confirmation, the NFL Management Council (NFLMC) and
individual teams continued to seek dollar for dollar offsets in various state
workers’ compensation tribunals and courts. The NFLPA returned to the
district court asking for injunctive relief, arguing that the NFLMC and
participating teams were violating the arbitration award and the district court’s
confirmation. The district court issued an injunctive order granting relief to the
players and held that Paragraph 10 of the CBAprovides for a time offset and
preempts any state law to the contrary. The NFLMC challenged the district
court’s Order, arguing that the district court does not have the authority to
resolve the preemption issue in proceedings to enforce the arbitration award.
The Second Circuit held that the district court’s authority does not extend
beyond the terms under the arbitration award. The court explained that the
98. Id. at 298.
99. 839 N.W.2d 324 (Neb. 2013).
100. No. 12-0402-cv, 2013 WL 1693951 (2d Cir. Apr. 19, 2013).
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district court’s conclusion expanded the terms of the arbitration award as the
arbitrator expressly declined to resolve the question of Paragraph 10 in the CBA
and the preemption of state law.
Tenn. Football, Inc. v. NFLPA101
Tennessee Football, Inc. and the NFL Management Council sought
confirmation of an arbitration award against former NFL players for the
Tennessee Titans (the Players). The Players filed worker’s compensation in
California in contradiction of the choice of law provision in their NFL contracts
that required Tennessee or Texas (if the player signed with the team while it was
located in Houston, Texas) law to govern all legal proceedings.
In making its determination, the court stated that federal labor policy
“strongly favors the resolution of labor disputes through arbitration.”102
Furthermore, the Court clarified that an arbitration award will be confirmed if
on its face it is a plausible interpretation of the contract. In this instance, the
court found that the arbitrator did not stray from the contractual language and
followed the plain meaning of the disputed provisions. Thus, the arbitration
award was confirmed.
MISCELLANEOUS
The following cases represent decisions that do not fall in any particular
area of law, but are significant to the sports industry.
Doe 6 v. Pa. State Univ.103
Plaintiff John Doe 6 claimed that Gerald Sandusky, a football coach for
Pennsylvania State University (PSU), sexually abused him when Doe was
seven-years-old. Specifically, Doe claimed that Sandusky used his position with
PSU to lure him into PSU campus showers and sexually molest him. Among
other claims, Doe sued PSU for vicarious liability and PSU moved to dismiss.
The district court dismissed Doe’s vicarious liability claim because Sandusky’s
sexual molestation was an unlawful, outrageous action outside the scope of his
employment as a PSU football coach, and Doe’s complaint did not explain how
sexual abuse of a minor “was the kind of act that PSU employed Sandusky to
perform or how Sandusky was actuated by intent to serve PSU.”104

101.
102.
103.
104.

No. 12–CV–2812 BEN (DHB), 2013 WL 3338630 (S.D. Cal. July 1, 2013).
Id. at *1.
No.13–0336, 2013 WL 5942380 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 6, 2013).
Id. at *7.
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Hebert v. La. State Racing Ass’n105
The Louisiana State Racing Association Commission suspended licensed
racehorse trainer Joseph Hebert after eight of his horses tested positive for a
banned drug. Following a hearing before the Commission, Herbert accepted a
three-year suspension. Nevertheless, Herbert appealed the Commission’s
decision after he learned that the drug was not listed as banned until after his
horses tested positive. Given this information, the trial court gave Herbet
additional time to conduct discovery, but the Commission filed a writ seeking
to reverse the trial court’s decision.
The Louisiana appellate court denied the Commission’s writ because
determining whether or not the banned drug was listed as banned when
Herbert’s horses tested positive was material to the case’s resolution.
Additionally, the court noted that Herbert had good reason for not presenting
evidence about the banned drug at the original hearing because there was a
legitimate question about whether Herbert knew the drug was banned.
Hooser v. Ohio State Racing Comm’n106
Darrell Hooser, a licensed horse trainer, allegedly abused one of his horses
for escaping from its stall. A witness overheard Hooser claim that he was going
to harm the horse and another trainer overheard whipping sounds after Hooser
recaptured the horse in its stall. Additionally, a security guard testified about
Hooser’s angry reputation with horses and that he saw welts in an “X” pattern
on the horse. For these reasons, the Ohio State Racing Commission held a
hearing and revoked Hooser’s training license.
The court determined that based on the above evidence, the Racing
Commission did not abuse its discretion by revoking Hooser’s license for
whipping the horse even though no person directly witnessed him whipping the
horse. Additionally, the court found that testimony about Hooser’s reputation
did not necessarily constitute hearsay because administrative agencies are not
bound by rules of evidence.
NFL v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co.107
Former NFL players filed 140 lawsuits against the NFL that allege the NFL
knew about and failed to protect the players from concussions and other head
injuries. The NFL sought a California declaration that its insurance companies

105. 125 So. 3d 609 (La. App. 2013).
106. No. 13AP–320, 2013 WL 5963105 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 5, 2013).
107. 157 Cal. Rptr. 3d 312 (Ct. App. 2013).
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must indemnify the NFL under all the policies for damages they have to pay
their former players.
The NFL and insurance companies are also parties to parallel coverage
actions in New York.108 The insurers sought a stay or dismissal of the NFL’s
California case based on the theory forum non-conveniens. A California trial
court ordered the case stayed and the appellate court affirmed the order,
reasoning that the NFL is headquartered and operated in New York, brokered
most of its insurance policies from New York, and most of its personnel
involved in this litigation are employed in New York.
CONCLUSION
The cases decided in 2013 will likely have a strong impact in the
development of sports law. While this survey does not include an exhaustive
list of every sports-related case decided in 2013, it does include brief summaries
of many interesting cases and highlights the interrelation of various areas of law
to sports law.
Sarah Sharrar, Survey Editor (2013–2014)
with contributions from Christian L. Bray,
Andrew N. Docter, and Benjamin Heller

108. Id. at 906.

